By Dr. Simon Trew, Stephen Badsey
Conflict for Caen КНИГИ ;ВОЕННАЯ ИСТОРИЯ Издательство: Sutton Publishing LimitedСерия: conflict sector NormandyАвтор(ы): Simon Trew, Stephen BadseyЯзык: EnglishГод издания: 2004Количество страниц: 97x2ISBN: 0-7509-3010-1Формат: pdf (300 dpi) 3562x2735Размер: 94.4 mbRapid 17
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In the case of vicious people, the possibility exists that they will become convinced that they ought to change how they act. Conversion of the understanding is possible in cases of vice, but not in cases of akrasia. This is because vicious people lack some belief or piece of knowledge that akratic people do not lack, and the possibility is there that the requisite belief or article of knowledge might be taken up by a vicious person if the right circumstances were to come about. This argument is faulty for the reason that it neglects the importance of habituation as a factor in human actions.
Most external observers likely would rate the first type of case, an example of akrasia in respect to anger, as more disgraceful and more shameful than the second case, which exemplifies akrasia in respect to the appetites. While I concede that Aristotle is successful in differentiating unqualified from qualified akrasia on the internal grounds that the thought processes of the unqualified akratic are more shameful than those of the qualified akratic, I do not think that the overt actions of the one need be more shameful than those of the other.
We may lack practical wisdom because we lack familiarity with relevant general principles. In such cases, however, we would be vicious instead of akratic, since vicious people are ignorant about what their ends ought to be. Two other ways that we can fall short of having practical wisdom are if we lack proper habituation or if something interferes with our reasoning processes. As we will see, either of these shortcomings is capable of opening the door for akrasia. Aristotle’s explanation of akrasia in Nicomachean Ethics centers mainly on the issue of how the reasoning process of the akratic person is rendered ineffectual at the moment of action.